Incidental Intellectual Property by Frye, Brian L.
University of Kentucky 
UKnowledge 
Law Faculty Scholarly Articles Law Faculty Publications 
Winter 2017 
Incidental Intellectual Property 
Brian L. Frye 
University of Kentucky College of Law, brianlfrye@uky.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Repository Citation 
Frye, Brian L., "Incidental Intellectual Property" (2017). Law Faculty Scholarly Articles. 606. 
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/606 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more 
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
Incidental Intellectual Property 
Notes/Citation Information 
Brian L. Frye, Incidental Intellectual Property, 33 Ent. & Sports Law. 24 (2017). 
This article is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub/606 
Published in Entertainment & Sports Lawyer, Volume 33, Number 2, Winter 2017. © 2017 by the American Bar Association. Reproduced with 
permission. All rights reserved. This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or 
stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
 
Entertainment and Sports Lawyer  Page 24  Winter 2017 / Volume 33, Number 2 
 
 
I ncidental I ntellectual Property 
BY BRIAN L. FRYE 
 
 As Mark Twain apocryphally observed, “History 
doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.”{1]  The history 
of the right of publicity reflects a common intellectual 
property rhyme. Much like copyright, the right of publicity 
is an incidental intellectual property right that emerged 
out of regulation. Over time, the property right gradually 
detached itself from the regulation and evolved into an 
independent legal doctrine. 
 Copyright emerged from the efforts of the 
Stationers’ Company to preserve its members’ monopoly 
on the publication of works of authorship. Similarly, it 
can be argued the right of publicity emerged from the 
efforts of bubblegum companies to preserve their monopoly 
on the publication of baseball cards. In both situations, 
those efforts to preserve a monopoly resulted in the 
incidental creation of an intellectual property right.   
 
A Potted History of Copyright 
 
 Today, we take copyright more or less for granted. 
Modern copyright gives authors certain property rights 
in their works of authorship. And most people assume 
that authors are entitled to some kind of copyright 
protection, even if they differ about its legitimate 
justification, scope and duration.[2]  
 But that wasn’t always the case. Copyright hasn’t 
always existed and didn’t always belong to authors. 
Before the invention of the printing press in the 15th 
century, copyright was irrelevant, because copying a 
work of authorship was expensive, so copies were rare. 
While governments censored certain works of authorship, 
they largely ignored the reproduction of uncensored 
works.[3] 
 The introduction of movable type in 1450 changed 
everything. Suddenly, printers could reproduce works of 
authorship relatively inexpensively, and copies of works 
of authorship became increasingly common. Initially, 
governments continued to focus on censorship, prohibiting 
the publication of immoral and seditious works. [4] But in 
1557, publishers created “copyright” by persuading 
Parliament to charter the Stationers’ Company and give 
its members a monopoly over censorship and publication. 
And in 1662, Parliament extended that “copyright” 
monopoly by passing the Licensing of the Press Act.[5] 
 The Licensing Act was unpopular, and in 1694, 
Parliament refused to renew it, ending the monopoly.[6] 
But in 1710, publishers convinced Parliament to pass the 
Statute of Anne, which purported to benefit authors by 
giving them an alienable exclusive right to reproduce 
copies of their works of authorship.[7] In fact, the Statute 
of Anne was intended to revive the Stationers’ Company’s 
monopoly by enabling publishers to purchase that exclusive 
right. But in the process, it inadvertently created the first 
modern copyright by transforming works of authorship 
into a form of intangible property. Gradually, copyright 
divorced itself from the regulatory monopoly it was 
intended to protect, and evolved into an independent 
intellectual property right, with an anti-monopoly 
justification.[8] 
 
The Right to Privacy and the Right of Publicity 
 
 Similarly, the “right of publicity,” which gives people 
a property right in their name and likeness, grew out of 
the “right to privacy,” which gives people an inalienable 
“right to be let alone.” The right to privacy enables people 
to prohibit certain uses of their name and likeness by 
creating an action in tort for invasion of privacy. But it 
creates a personal right, not a property right, because it 
cannot be transferred and terminates at death.  
 By contrast, the right of publicity gives people 
alienable exclusive rights in the use of their name and 
likeness. The right of publicity typically enables people 
to prohibit the commercial use of their name and likeness 
without permission. And it creates a property right, 
because it can be transferred, in whole or in part, and 
may not terminate at death.[9] 
 
The Origins of the Right to Privacy 
 
 Today, many question the influence and relevance 
of law review articles,[10] but the right to privacy was 
created out of whole cloth in one of the most influential 
law review articles ever written.[11] In 1890, Samuel 
Warren and Louis Brandeis published an article titled 
“The Right to Privacy” in the Harvard Law Review.[12] 
At the time, the common law recognized causes of action 
in tort for slander and libel, or the dissemination of false 
statements that harm a person’s reputation.[13] But Warren 
and Brandeis observed that true statements can also cause 
harm when they improperly intrude into a person’s private 
life, and they argued that the common law should recognize 
a cause of action in tort for invasion of privacy in order 
to prevent those harms.[14] They characterized the “right 
to privacy” as “the right to be let alone,” and explained: 
 
The design of the law must be to protect 
those persons with whose affairs the 
community has no legitimate concern, from  
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being dragged into an undesirable and 
undesired publicity and to protect all 
persons, whatsoever; their position or station, 
from having matters which they may 
properly prefer to keep private, made public 
against their will. It is the unwarranted 
invasion of individual privacy which is 
reprehended, and to be, so far as possible, 
prevented.[15] 
 
 While Warren and Brandeis did not invent the 
concept of a “right to privacy,” or even coin the phrase, 
they showed how it was consistent with existing common 
law doctrines.[16] In 1908, the Supreme Court of Georgia 
became the first state supreme court to recognize a 
common law right to privacy, and many others soon 
followed.[17] And when state supreme courts declined to 
recognize a common law right to privacy, state legislatures 
often created a statutory right. 
 For example, in 1902, a teenage girl named Abigail 
M. Roberson sued the Rochester Folding Box Co. and 
the Franklin Mills Co. for using a lithograph of her likeness 
to advertise Franklin Mills Flour.[18] The New York Court 
of Appeals dismissed the lawsuit, holding that the common 
law did not create a “right of privacy,” but observing that 
the legislature “could very well interfere and arbitrarily 
provide that no one should be permitted for his own selfish 
purpose to use the picture or the name of another for 
advertising purposes without his consent.”[19] In response, 
the New York Legislature enacted the New York Privacy 
Law of 1903, which provided that the commercial use of a 
person’s name or likeness without their written consent 
was both a misdemeanor and a tort.[20] 
 However, some courts held that the common law 
right to privacy only prohibits the improper public 
disclosure of private facts, and therefore does not 
necessarily prohibit the commercial use of a person’s 
name or likeness without permission.[21] And most courts 
held that the right to privacy is an inalienable personal 
right, not an assignable property right.[22] As a consequence, 
the recognition of the right to privacy provided only a 
qualified right to control the use of a person’s name and 
likeness. 
 
A Potted History of Baseball Cards 
 
 Baseball originated in English bat-and-ball games 
dating from time immemorial. The first known reference 
to “base-ball” appeared in 1744, but the term referred to 
a congeries of bat-and-ball games until the mid-19th 
century. In 1845, Alexander Cartwright of New York’s 
Knickerbocker Club created modern baseball by codifying 
the “Knickerbocker Rules,” and within a decade baseball 
became the most popular sport in America.[23] 
 Proto-baseball cards appeared soon after modern 
baseball became a popular sport, in the form of “cartes 
de visite” and “trade cards.” Cartes de visite are small 
photographs mounted on cardboard. They were invented 
in 1854, and became wildly popular in the United States 
during the Civil War, because they provided an inexpensive 
way for soldiers and their families to exchange photographs. 
But photographers also sold commercial cartes de visite 
featuring assorted celebrities, including baseball players. 
 Trade cards are cardstock cards with an image printed 
on one side and text printed on the other, used by businesses 
to advertise their products and services. In the late 1860s, 
as baseball became a professional sport, businesses 
began using images of baseball players and teams on 
their trade cards.  
 In the early 1870s, tobacco companies started using 
cardstock to reinforce paper cigarette packages. At first, 
these “cigarette cards” were blank, but in 1875, the Allen 
& Ginter tobacco company of Richmond, Virginia started 
using trade cards, which did double duty as advertisements. 
Among other things, Allen & Ginter’s cigarette cards 
featured images of baseball players, making them the 
first true “baseball cards.”  
 Cigarette cards featuring images of baseball players 
proved popular with children, so candy manufacturers 
soon began using baseball cards as promotional items. In 
1888, the G&B Chewing Gum Company of New York 
included baseball cards in its packages of gum, and other 
candy manufacturers sporadically followed suit. Between 
1908 and 1915, the American Caramel Company of 
Philadelphia issued several sets of baseball cards that it 
sold with caramel. In 1909, the John H. Dockman & 
Sons Company issued a set of baseball cards that it sold 
with gum. And in 1914 and 1915, Reuck Bros. & Eckstein 
of Brooklyn and Chicago, the owner of Cracker Jack, 
issued unusually large sets of cards, and included one 
card in each box.[24] 
 
Early Baseball Cards and the Right to Privacy 
 
 These early baseball cards predated the creation of 
the right to privacy, and were often created without the 
permission or knowledge of the baseball players they 
featured. But as courts increasingly recognized a common 
law right to privacy and legislatures began to create 
statutory rights to privacy, companies started to ask 
baseball players for permission to use their names and 
likenesses on baseball cards. 
 For example, between 1909 and 1911, the American 
Tobacco Company (“ATC”) of Durham, North Carolina 
issued the so-called “T206” series of cigarette cards 
featuring 524 different baseball subjects, primarily baseball 
players.[25] ATC hired sports journalists to offer baseball 
players $10 for permission to use their names and 
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likenesses on its cigarette cards. While North Carolina 
courts did not recognize a right to privacy at that time, 
ATC distributed its cigarettes nationally, and presumably 
sought explicit permission in order to avoid liability in 
other states, including New York.[26] 
 At some point, Pittsburgh Pirates shortstop Johannes 
Peter "Honus" Wagner either refused or rescinded 
permission to use his name and likeness on cigarette 
cards, because he “did not care to have his picture in a 
package of cigarettes,” and returned his $10 fee to ATC.[27] 
While ATC immediately stopped issuing Honus Wagner 
cards, it had already released about 200. As a consequence 
of Wagner’s belated withdrawal of permission to use his 
name and likeness, the T206 Honus Wagner card is quite 
rare, and is currently the most valuable baseball card in 
the world, selling for as much as $2.7 million.[28] 
 
Modern Baseball Cards 
 
After the First World War, tobacco companies gradually 
stopped issuing cigarette cards, but candy and gum 
manufacturers continued to issue sets of baseball cards. 
Between 1921 and 1927, the American Caramel Company 
of Philadelphia issued three sets of baseball cards. But 
baseball cards soon became associated with gum. In 1933, 
five bubblegum companies issued sets of baseball cards 
of varying sizes: The Delong Company of Chicago issued a 
24-card set; George C. Miller & Company of Boston 
issued a 32-card set; the Orbit Gum Co. of Chicago issued 
a 60-card set; the World Wide Gum Company of 
Montreal issued a 94-card set; and the Goudey Gum 
Company of Boston issued a 239-card set.[29]  
 Miller, Delong, and Orbit did not continue making 
baseball cards. But in1934, the National Chicle Company 
of Chicago entered the market, issued a 24-card “Diamond 
Stars” set and an 80-card “Batter Up” set. Goudey, World 
Wide, and National Chicle issued an assortment of sets 
of baseball cards in 1935 and 1936. But World Wide and 
National Chicle stopped making baseball cards in 1937, 
leaving only Goudey.[30] 
 Goudey briefly dominated the baseball card business, 
but in 1939, Gum, Inc. of Philadelphia entered the market, 
issuing a 161-card set. Goudey and Gum competed with 
each other until 1941, issuing multiple sets of baseball 
cards. 
 
Modern Baseball Cards & the Right to Privacy 
 
 Before the Second World War, the baseball card 
industry operated largely informally. There were few 
legal disputes between baseball players and the baseball 
card companies that used their names and likenesses, 
possibly because the players had little or no legal leverage. 
For example, in 1941, St. Louis Cardinals first baseman 
John Robert “Johnny” Mize sued Gum in for using his 
name and likeness without permission in its “Double 
Play” set of baseball cards, but lost.[31] 
 During the Second World War, the production of 
baseball cards stopped, due to wartime rationing of raw 
materials. After the Second World War, the popularity of 
baseball skyrocketed, and in 1948, the Bowman Gum 
Company (formerly Gum, Inc.) and the Leaf Gum 
Company of Chicago both issued sets of baseball cards.  
 Bowman signed 106 baseball players to exclusive 
contracts and issued a set of 48 black and white baseball 
cards. In exchange for “the ‘exclusive right to print, 
publish, exhibit, display and sell’ the ballplayer's 
photograph together with his name, signature or facsimile 
thereof” in connection with the sale of chewing gum, the 
player received $10, plus an additional $90 “if he was a 
member of a major league baseball club for the first 31 
days after the opening of the official baseball season.[32]  
 By contrast, Leaf signed baseball players to non-
exclusive contracts, and issued a set of 98 color baseball 
cards. At least 24 of the cards in the Leaf set depicted 
baseball players who had exclusive contracts with 
Bowman. Bowman sued Leaf, alleging that Leaf had 
improperly interfered with its exclusive contracts, and 
the parties quickly settled, with Leaf agreeing not to 
issue any baseball cards until 1951.[33] 
 As Bowman continued to sign more baseball players 
to exclusive contracts and started issuing larger sets of 
baseball cards, its profits quickly increased.[34] And 
competitors took notice. In 1951, the Topps Chewing 
Gum Company of Brooklyn, New York entered the 
baseball card business, signing contracts with baseball 
players and issuing a 104 card set of baseball cards, 
packaged with a caramel candy. In response, Bowman 
signed its baseball players to new exclusive contracts 
that covered both chewing gum and “confections.” 
 
Baseball Cards & the Creation of the Right of Publicity 
 
 In 1952, Bowman was purchased by Haelan 
Laboratories, Inc., and Topps issued a 407 card set of 
baseball cards, packaged with chewing gum. Hundreds 
of the baseball players depicted in the Topps set had 
signed exclusive contracts with Haelan. So Haelan sued 
Topps in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York, alleging unfair competition, 
trademark infringement, and interference with contractual 
relations. Topps responded that Haelan failed to state a 
claim because under New York law the “statutory right of 
privacy is personal, not assignable.”[35] In other words, 
Topps argued that the baseball players could waive their 
right to privacy, but could not assign it in an exclusive 
contract. The district court agreed with Topps and 
dismissed Haelan’s complaint, and Haelan appealed. 
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 The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Haelan’s 
exclusive contracts with baseball players provided not 
only a release from liability for invasion of the right to 
privacy, but also a promise not to provide a release to 
anyone else. And the Second Circuit held that Topps 
tortiously interfered with Haelan’s exclusive contracts 
by inducing baseball players to breach their promise not 
to provide a release from liability to anyone other than 
Haelan.[36] But the Second Circuit also held that people 
possess an assignable “right of publicity”: 
 
We think that, in addition to and independent 
of that right of privacy (which in New York 
derives from statute), a man has a right in the 
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the 
right to grant the exclusive privilege of 
publishing his picture, and that such a grant 
may validly be made ‘in gross,’ i.e., without 
an accompanying transfer of a business or of 
anything else. Whether it be labelled a 
‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as 
often elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ simply 
symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a 
claim which has pecuniary worth. 
 
This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ 
For it is common knowledge that many 
prominent persons (especially actors and 
ball-players), far from having their feelings 
bruised through public exposure of their 
likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they 
no longer received money for authorizing 
advertisements, popularizing their 
countenances, displayed in newspapers, 
magazines, busses, trains and subways. This 
right of publicity would usually yield them 
no money unless it could be made the subject 
of an exclusive grant which barred any other 
advertiser from using their pictures.[37] 
 
 As a result, the Second Circuit effectively created a 
new kind of intellectual property, the “right of publicity,” 
which gives people an alienable right in the commercial 
use of their name and likeness. After Haelan, not only 
could people prevent the commercial use of their name 
and likeness without their permission, but also they could 
transfer the right to control the commercial use of their 
name and likeness to someone else.[38] 
 Ironically, Haelan was a pyrrhic victory. The Second 
Circuit remanded the case to the district court, where it 
became clear that Haelan had failed to sign exclusive 
contracts with enough players to monopolize the baseball 
card business, and had bungled the renewal of many of 
its contracts.[39] As a consequence, both Haelan and 
Topps continued to issue baseball cards. In late 1953, 
Connelly Containers, Inc. acquired Haelan in a merger. 
And on January 20, 1956, Topps bought Haelan’s baseball 
card and bubble gum business for $200,000, and became 
the dominant manufacturer of baseball cards. 
 
The Baseball Card Monopoly 
 
 Topps wasn’t satisfied with dominance, it wanted a 
monopoly. After purchasing Haelan, it signed exclusive 
contracts with as many major and minor league baseball 
players as possible, and focused on signing minor league 
players before they made the majors. The Topps form 
contract “guaranteed the player a lump-sum payment of 
$125 for each season in which eith r his picture was used 
or the player was an active member of a major league club” 
and “ran until Topps had made five years of payments to 
the individual player.”[40] Within a few years, Topps 
signed exclusive contracts with almost every professional 
baseball player. 
 In 1965, the Federal Trade Commission filed an 
antitrust action against Topps, alleging that it had 
monopolized the baseball card business by forming 
exclusive contracts with about 414 of 421 major league 
baseball players, and “practically all minor league players 
having a major league potential.”[41] While the hearing 
examiner ruled against Topps, the Commission reversed, 
primarily because the Topps contracts were limited to 
baseball cards sold alone or in connection with gum and 
candy, so competitors could sell baseball cards in 
connection with other products. But the Commission 
also observed that the FTC could not interfere with the 
ability of baseball players to alienate their right of 
publicity.[42] After the FTC decision, Topps bought out 
Fleer, its only remaining competitor, and consolidated its 
control of the baseball card business.[43] 
 In 1966, the Major League Baseball Players 
Association hired Marvin Miller as its Executive Director. 
Miller created a group licensing program, under which 
players authorized the Players Association to negotiate 
group licenses of their right of publicity, but retained the 
right to negotiate individual licenses. It avoided conflict 
with Topps’ exclusive contracts by explicitly excluding 
publicity rights that players had already conveyed. As a 
consequence, the Players Association could not negotiate 
group licenses for baseball cards sold alone, or in 
connection with gum or candy. The first group license 
authorized Coca-Cola to put pictures of baseball players 
on the underside of bottle caps. It was quite successful, 
and the Players Association soon negotiated group 
licenses with many other companies.[44] 
 The Players Association also focused on increasing 
compensation under Topps’ exclusive contracts with 
individual baseball players. Miller persuaded players not 
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to renew their exclusive contracts with Topps, which 
eventually enabled him to renegotiate the terms of Topps’ 
contracts. On November 18, 1968, Topps formed a new 
agreement with the Players Association that “increased 
the players' lump sum license payments from $125 to 
$250 per year” and provided each player “a pro rata 
share of 8% of Topps' sales up to four million dollars 
and 10% of Topps' sales over four million.”[45] 
 In 1974, Fleer decided to re-enter the baseball card 
business, but quickly ran afoul of Topps and the Players 
Association. Fleer tried to obtain a group license to sell 
large (5”x7”) patches and cards, but after consulting with 
Topps, the Players Association refused. Fleer responded 
by filing an antitrust action against Topps and the Players 
Association in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.[46] 
 The district court found that Topps and the Players 
Association had conspired to monopolize the baseball 
card business. It observed that Fleer effectively could 
not obtain individual licenses to sell baseball cards alone 
or with gum or candy, because Topps had exclusive 
contracts with substantially all professional baseball 
players, and that it could not obtain a group license to 
sell baseball cards with other products, because the Players 
Association refused to negotiate one. As a result, Topps 
and the Players Association exercised monopoly power 
over the baseball card business. The district court awarded 
only nominal damages to Fleer, but enjoined Topps from 
forming or enforcing exclusive contracts with baseball 
players, and ordered the Players Association to grant at 
least one group license to sell baseball cards.[47] 
 Pursuant to the district court’s order, the Players 
Association granted Fleer a non-exclusive group license 
to sell baseball cards, which Fleer immediately used.[48] 
Both Topps and Fleer appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Topps appealed the 
judgment, and Fleer sought an expanded injunction 
banning Topps from the baseball card business for one 
year and forcing Topps to obtain group licenses through 
the Players Association, rather than exclusive contracts 
with individual baseball players. The Third Circuit 
reversed the district court, holding that neither Topps’ 
exclusive contracts nor the Players Association’s group 
licenses were unreasonable restraints of trade, and that 
Fleer had failed to prove that Topps and the Players 
Association actually exercised monopoly power, because 
competitors could negotiate their own exclusive contracts 
with individual baseball players.[49] 
 
The Rise and Demise of the Reserve Clause 
 
 The Players Association not only helped baseball 
players claim a larger percentage of the value of their 
right of publicity, but also helped them claim a larger 
percentage of the value of their labor. The first labor union 
representing baseball players was the Brotherhood of 
Professional Base Ball Players, formed in 1885. It was 
followed by the Players' Protective Association in 1900, 
the Fraternity of Professional Baseball Players of America 
in 1912 and the American Baseball Guild in 1946. The 
prime target of all of those unions was the hated “reserve 
clause,” a part of every player’s contract that gave the team 
a unilateral option to renegotiate and assign the contract. 
Any player who breached the reserve clause was blacklisted. 
As a consequence, players were bound to their team, unless 
they obtained an unconditional release.[50] 
 Despite the rather dubious legality of the reserve 
clause, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that it did not 
violate the Sherman Act, on increasingly implausible 
grounds. In 1915, the owner of the Baltimore Terrapins 
filed an antitrust action against the National League and 
American League, alleging that they violated the Sherman 
Act by conspiring to destroy the former Federal League, 
but the Court held that professional baseball was exempt 
from federal regulation under the Sherman Act because 
it was not “interstate commerce.”[51] In 1950, George 
Earl Toolson filed an antitrust action against the New 
York Yankees, alleging that the reserve clause was an 
improper restraint of trade under the Sherman Act, but 
the Court reaffirmed its holding that professional baseball 
was exempt from the Sherman Act, essentially based on 
reliance.[52] And in 1970, Curtis Charles Flood, filed an 
antitrust action against Major League Baseball 
Commissioner Bowie Kuhn, alleging that the reserve 
clause violated the Sherman Act and comparing it to 
slavery. While the Court finally acknowledged that 
professional baseball was indeed interstate commerce, it 
nevertheless held that baseball was exempt from federal 
regulation under the Sherman Act, based on the principle 
of stare decisis.[53] 
 But the reserve clause was already on its way out. 
In 1968, the Players Association had negotiated the first-
ever collective bargaining agreement in professional sports, 
which increased the minimum salary from $6,000 to 
$10,000, among other things. In 1970, it negotiated the 
right for players to arbitrate grievances. In 1972, the 
players went on strike and forced the owners to accept 
binding arbitration. And in 1975, Dave McNally and 
Andy Messersmith challenged the perpetual reserve 
clause in binding arbitration and prevailed. When the 
arbitrator’s decision was affirmed by the federal courts, 
the reserve clause was no more.[54] Suddenly, professional 
baseball players could become free agents and negotiate 
their salaries independently. 
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Conclusion 
 
The Stationers’ Company convinced Parliament to create 
“modern copyright” in order to preserve its monopoly on 
the publication of works of authorship, but inadvertently 
created a new intellectual property right with an 
independent, anti-monopoly justification. Likewise, 
Warren and Brandeis created the “right to privacy” in 
order to enable people to protect their right to be let 
alone, but inadvertently enabled the creation of the “right  
 
 
of publicity,” a property right that enables celebrities to 
do precisely the opposite. 
 The Stationers’ Company initially used copyright to 
protect its members’ monopoly on the publication of 
works of authorship, and Haelan and Topps use the right 
of publicity to protect their monopoly over the publication 
of baseball cards. But just asuthors eventually reclaimed 
copyright for themselves, so too did baseball players 
eventually reclaim the right of publicity
 
 
Endnotes 
 
[1]  But see Mark Twain & Charles Dudley Warner, The 
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